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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT ONE
EXHIBIT ONE WAS A BEGINNING POINT OF NEGOTIATION AND

NOT

ACCEPTED BY EITHER PARTY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS IN ANY WAY
BINDING ON EITHER PARTY.

POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF MISINTERPRETS THE GATES-MYERS-DESPAIN LINE OF CASES.

POINT THREE:
MRS. SNITCHLER MADE AN INTELLIGENT DECISION 'I'O MODIFY THE
DECREE BASED UPON HER OWN INVESTIGATION AND COUNSEL.

1

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE

EXHIBIT ONE WAS A BEGINNING POINT OF NEGOTIATION AND WAS NOT
ACCEPTED BY EITHER PARTY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS IN ANY WAY
BINDING ON EITHER PARTY.

Mrs, Sn Itchier places great weight on the initial unsigned
stipulation presented to her, which is represented by exhibit one.
Mr, Montgomery never proposed
purpose v-

** and did not sign I t.

, ;

egotiation.

Its sole

Mr. Montgomery J"s

proposal was the executed stipulation ultimately agreed to by the
parties and approved by the court,
•* pari

At best the initial document is

uf negotiations And therefore should be given no weight.
POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF MISINTERPRETS THE GATES-MYERS-DE SPAIN LINE OF CASES.
: ' • - • relies exclusive] y on the authority of Gates

Mi
Gates,

787

P.2d

1344

(Utah

App.

1990).

Gates,

v

stands for the

proposition that a party cannot claim the benefit of asking for a
finding of "no change of circumstances' when the reason there is no
change is that he previously misrepresented his income.

The court

has consistently treated differently those issues that were subject
to the equitable powers of the court and those that were propei: ty
2

agreements and susceptible to contract principles.

The

Court

in Gates,

of Appeals

specifically

approval the distinctions made in Myers v Myers,
App.

quoted

768 P. 2d 979

with
(Utah

1989).

In Myers, this court noted that while contract theories
such as bargain and waiver are properly applied to a stipulation as
to property-distribution, such theories are inapplicable to issues
which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the court, such
as child custody and support.
In Myers,

the Court of Appeals was critical of the defendant

for trying to make the distinction Mrs. Snitchler wants the court
to make in the present case.
In Despain,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that,
[d]efendant has failed to observe the distinction between those
cases involving the statutory power of a court in a divorce
proceeding to enter orders concerning support and those cases in
which parties in a divorce action have settled their property
rights by agreement, the terms of which are incorporated in a
decree. (Myers;
In Despain
Court

reached

v Despain,

627 P.2d

the conclusion

526

(Utah

that parties

1981),

the Supreme

to a divorce

could

bargain for property settlements that were beyond the power of the
court to impose because they were a part of the quid pro quo of a
divorce settlement and subject to contract law principles.
A husband, who has undertaken an obligation in consideration
of the provisions of the property settlement agreement which were
for his benefit cannot subsequently complain that the court, in the
absence of such agreement would have been without power to order
him to do so.
(Despain)
The court affirmed the right of parties to bargain their
property rights as may seem to them in their individual best
interest.

3

Mrs. Snitchler wrongly interprets the meaning of the "Woodward
Formula".

Woodward v Woodward,

656 P.2d

431 (Utah

1982)

and all of

its progeny stand for the proposition that pension and retirement
benefits are marital assets susceptible of division as part of the
property settlement.

Appellee acknowledges in her brief that to

obtain her relief the court must reinterpret and create "an
additional exception" to the established case law.
POINT THREE
MRS. SNITCHLER MADE AN INTELLIGENT DECISION TO MODIFY THE DECREE
BASED UPON HER OWN INVESTIGATION AND COUNSEL.
The simple fact is there was no misrepresentation of any kind
by Mr. Montgomery.

He did not even speak to Mrs. Snitchler for

more than a year before the stipulation was executed. His counsel
never even spoke with Mrs. Montgomery.

All negotiations were

conducted between attorney's. If there was a mistake taking place
in Mrs. Snitchler's interpretation of what could happen, Mr.
Montgomery had no way of knowing about it.

However there was no

mistake.
Montgomery gave her the proposed stipulation as an option in
straight

forward

plain

language.

Either waive

the monthly

retirement payment and take a percentage of the lump sum or wait
years for him to build up enough additional retirement benefits to
meet her $400.00 per month demand.

In consideration of her health

and the health of Mr. Montgomery her decision to execute the
stipulation was a reasonable one.

In an aging, frail, remarried

individual an immediate lump sum may be preferable to an income
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stream ten years in the future.
The stipulation and subsequent order are abundantly clear that
she is waiving and giving up all claim to any monthly payment or
annuity.

The disclosure is as plain as language can make it.

This is all the more poignant because she retired
Service as well.

from Civil

This is not some obscure retirement planf this is

government civil service.

There are several offices in the Ogden

area to answer any questions she or her counsel may have had.

The

document being signed by Mrs. Snitchler in October of 1989 was the
standard government form.
Her claim that it was some how hidden from her is ludicrous.
She had already retired herself and filled out the same form.

Even

if she hadn't she could easily obtained the form from any of the
local civil service offices.

But even if there was shenanigans

with the form, Civil Service required a new QDRO.

The government

document was not enough without a new QDRO to replace the existing
one.
The new QDRO required a new stipulation signed by the parties
and counsel.

Montgomery offered only one inducement to sign the

stipulation.

That was, his promise to retire now, if she waived

the monthly payments, instead of in ten years.

He told her if she

insisted on the rights she had under the prior order, then he would
work the next ten years to earn enough retirement benefits to pay
her and still live on the income he wanted to.
Montgomery could compel her.

There was no way

He could only propose the agreement

and offer to retire early if she signed.
5

It could only be done

with her consent to the stipulation. The court lacked authority to
impose the agreement if the parties didn't stipulate.

It could

only be done by bargained for agreement.
Montgomery lived up to his part of the bargain and retired.
Mrs. Snitchler now wants to renege on her promise. Don't let her.
CONCLUSION
This is a case in which Mrs. Snitchler was entitled to a
portion of her exhusband's civil service retirement benefits per
the divorce decree. The parties agreed to a modification of their
property rights.

The inducement for the modification was the

waiver by Mrs. Snitchler of monthly payments. Mr. Montgomery in
return agreed to retire early. Neither party could have compelled
the other to do what they stipulated to do.

The court lacked

jurisdiction to alter the property provisions of the decree except
as they bargained.
The principles

of bargain and exchange apply.

seriously thinks there was any misrepresentation.

No one
There is

absolutely no evidence of such. Mrs. Snitchler now wants more out
of Montgomery now that he is retired. She is suffering from buyers
remorse. At the time, her deal was an intelligent one considering
the length of time before Montgomery would otherwise retire and the
respective health of the parties.

The trial court's modification

should be overturned and the previous order honored.
Dated this 14th day of July, 1992.

Donald^C. Hughes
Attorney for Defend&nt/Appellant
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